




Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the
indicative ‘if’ is given by the material conditional. Putative coun-
terexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played
in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called
the Suppositional Procedure. Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture
has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humans’ primary way of
prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts
on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture.
Keywords: Indicative conditionals; Acceptability of conditionals;
Adams’ Thesis; Conditional probabilities.
1 Williamson on Indicatives
In his recent book Suppose and Tell. The Semantics and Heuristics of Condi-
tionals (Williamson, 2020), Timothy Williamson has proposed a new defense
of the view that the meaning of the indicative ‘if’ is given by the material
conditional: the binary truth-functional operator with bivalent semantics,
false when the antecedent is true and the consequent false, true otherwise.
The view is not very popular among philosophers who work on condition-
als (notable exceptions include Jackson (1987); Rieger (2013)). It has been
taken as facing clear counterexamples and as unable to handle compelling
data on the workings of conditionals, which are allegedly better dealt with,
for instance, by probabilistic treatments (Adams, 1975; Bennett, 2003; Edg-
ington, 1995; Evans and Over, 2004), or by modal or broadly Kratzerian ones
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(Stalnaker, 1968; Kratzer, 1986). Williamson’s intelligent, full-scale defense
of a view considered dead by most researchers is likely to sparkle a fruitful
debate.
According to Williamson, the putative counterexamples and data don’t
actually speak against the material conditional semantics. Nor can they
always be handled pragmatically, as per a traditional Gricean approach
(roughly: the natural language indicatives predicted as true by the mate-
rial conditional analysis, and which appear not to be, actually are true, but
unassertable in the relevant contexts). The Gricean approach has been crit-
icized by a number of authors, e.g., Edgington (1995), Bennett (2003), and
Williamson (2020), 107ff, takes a number of criticisms on board.
Williamson’s strategy is innovative in claiming that the recalcitrant data
have to be handled, rather than just pragmatically, epistemically, that is, as
connected to a cognitive procedure – a ‘heuristic’, as he calls it – we put in
place in our assessment of conditional sentences. The heuristic, like others
we use, e.g., in perceptual judgments, is generally but not perfectly reliable.
It delivers inconsistencies and paradoxical results when applied to cases one
would not easily think about, similarly to how our heuristic for applying the
truth predicate, which works fine in most everyday cases, gets us into trouble
with cases like the Liar, with which philosophers obsess more than laymen
(Williamson, 2020, 60-1). The objections to the material conditional analysis
rest on such a cognitive heuristic precisely in the cases where this is predicted
to go wrong.
In this paper, I will not speak for or against the view that the proposi-
tional content of ‘if’ is adequately captured by the material conditional. I’m
only interested in the Williamsonian heuristic. One reason why discussing it
is important, is that it connects to influential ideas due to Ramsey, Adams,
Evans and Over, and others, on how our acceptance of conditionals connects
to suppositional, imaginative and hypothetical thought: a cognitive activity
whose importance can hardly be overestimated. I introduce the heuristic in
the following Section.
2 The Suppositional Heuristic
The proposed heuristic is close to views endorsed by some psychologists of
reasoning (Evans et al., 2003; Oaksford and Chater, 2010). A main purpose
of ‘if’ is to trigger, or to articulate the results of, a process of hypothetical
thinking, whereby we assess the consequent on the supposition of the an-
tecedent. What Williamson dubs the ‘Suppositional Procedure’ works thus:
First, suppose A. Then, on that supposition, develop its conse-
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quences by whatever appropriate means you have available: con-
strained imagination, background knowledge, deduction ... If the
development leads to accepting C, conditionally on the suppo-
sition A, then accept the conditional ‘If A, C’ unconditionally,
from outside the supposition. If instead the development leads to
rejecting C conditionally on the supposition A, then reject ‘If A,
C’ unconditionally, from outside the supposition. (Williamson,
2020, 18)
Williamson claims that the Suppositional Procedure is nothing but (what
we now call) the Ramsey Test (Williamson, 2020, 26). In a famous footnote,
Ramsey wrote:
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q’ and are both in doubt as to
p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge
and arguing on that basis about q; so that in a sense ‘If p, q’ and
‘If p, ¬q’ are contradictories. We can say that they are fixing
their degrees of belief in q given p. (Ramsey, 1990, 155n).
An amount of psychological as well as philosophical literature (see, respec-
tively, Evans and Over (2004) and Bennett (2003) for classic surveys and
discussions) agrees in claiming that the Ramsey Test is a high level descrip-
tion of at least a crucial part of what goes on in our assessment of indicatives.
Williamson takes the Suppositional Procedure as an ‘offline analogue’ of
belief revision: supposing A is the offline counterpart of getting the informa-
tion that A, and applying the Procedure is the offline counterpart of updating
one’s beliefs in the light of the new information (Ibid). The Procedure comes
with a rule which governs a variety of attitudes towards conditionals:
Suppositional Rule. Take an attitude unconditionally to ‘If A,
C’ just in case you take it conditionally to C on the supposition
A. (Williamson, 2020, 19)
The Procedure unpacks the cognitive process we implement to apply the Rule
from right to left. Williamson’s argumentative strategy rests on a conjecture
accompanying the Procedure:
Suppositional Conjecture. The Suppositional Procedure is
humans’ primary way of prospectively assessing conditionals.1
(Williamson, 2020, 21)
1We assess prospectively when we don’t know that the antecedent is true (Williamson,
2020, 17). (When we do, we’d better test the consequent directly!) We can assess prospec-
tively also without applying the Procedure, typically because we rely on someone’s testi-
mony, but that’s a secondary or derivative, if widespread, way (Williamson, 2020, 20-1).
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The Suppositional Rule has troublesome consequences: when taken as
governing attitudes that come in degrees, like intermediate credences, it leads,
via plausible assumptions, to probabilistic paradoxes akin to the notorious
Lewisian triviality results (Lewis, 1976; Hajek, 1989, etc.). When taken as
governing attitudes to logical consequences, it leads to inconsistencies. This
doesn’t show that we haven’t really been following the Rule, Williamson
claims. Rather, we should admit that we use inconsistent cognitive proce-
dures to assess conditional claims (Williamson, 2007, 41). This matters for
the Williamsonian defense of the material conditional analysis: our cognitive
practices may just be inconsistent, provided they work in the vast majority
of ordinary situations; but no semantics can be inconsistent. Thus, none can
take all of our judgments concerning conditionals at face value while giving
the meaning of ‘if’. Next, given that we need a systematic explanation for
the patterns of mistakes, ‘postulating the Suppositional Rule as a primary
heuristic meets that need.’ (Williamson, 2020, 108)
The Suppositional Rule is about a variety of attitudes. The Suppositional
Procedure, as formulated in the quotation above, concerns one fundamental
attitude at issue in our assessment of conditionals: acceptance.2 I focus on
acceptance in the next Section.
3 Judgments of Acceptability
What could count as a refutation of the Suppositional Conjecture? Insofar
as it’s about a psychological heuristic, it is not refuted by examples of the
conditional attitude not aligning with the attitude towards the conditional,
provided such examples can be deemed infrequent, exotic, or recherché: cases
of the kind philosophers trained to look for counterexamples can come up
with, but which are alien to the layman’s ordinary practice. What would
be needed is a widespread, systematic misalignment, possibly of a kind that
can be checked experimentally. As Williamson claims: ‘the Suppositional
Conjecture is a psychological hypothesis, which in the end must live or die
by psychological evidence’ (Williamson, 2020, 22).3
There’s reason to think that the Suppositional Rule and Procedure are
violated, often enough, by the attitude of acceptance, insofar as conditional
2And its opposite: rejection. Some philosophers, e.g., Priest (2006), dispute the view
that rejection is reducible to the acceptance of negation. This is immaterial to our discus-
sion.
3Williamson admits that his book ‘does not contain much discussion of experimental
data’ (Williamson, 2020, 22): it presents a theoretical model of suppositional thinking, and
of how it connects to our assessment of conditionals. Williamson claims that we should
understand the model before testing it (Ibid.).
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acceptance connects to judgments of probability in the natural way: we
accept C conditionally on the supposition A when we assign 1, or a value
that passes a threshold θ ∈ [0.5, 1), to p(C|A).
If one thinks that acceptance can come in degrees, one may also phrase
the connection in terms of degrees of acceptance, with 0 marking full rejec-
tion, 1 full acceptance: one accepts C conditionally on supposition A to a
degree equal to p(C|A). When restricted to simple indicative conditionals
– conditionals with no other conditionals embedded in their antecedent or
consequent – this leads straightforwardly to Adams’ Thesis (Adams, 1966,
1975): the claim that the degree of acceptability of a simple indicative equals
the corresponding conditional probability.4
We sometimes accept C conditionally on A, while A’s being the case
doesn’t affect the acceptability of C, which was highly acceptable anyway.
When that happens, we may not accept the corresponding conditional:
1. If Venus is bigger than Mars, then Mars is a planet.
It’s pretty common knowledge that Mars is a planet. Several people who are
quite certain of that, may be uncertain of the relative size of Venus and Mars.
They will accept that Mars is a planet under the supposition that Venus is
bigger than Mars. Their probability for C conditional on A is or may well
be 1. But they may not accept (1).
One may retort that (1) is a peculiar case, insofar as one takes its con-
sequent as having probability 1. Conditionals with extreme antecedent or
consequent probabilities are often deemed anomalous. I myself think this
is wrong (Berto and Özgün, 2021). Anyway, the same can happen with
conditionals to whose consequents one assigns high enough but less than 1
probability:
2. If this coin is a penny, then there will be some heads in its first 50
tosses.
Say you are very confident that this coin is fair, but uncertain of what
sort of coin it is. You may accept that there’ll be some heads in its first 50
tosses, conditionally on the supposition that it’s a penny: the supposition
4Adams’ Thesis is sometimes, but should not be, confused with Stalnaker’s Hypothesis
(Stalnaker, 1975), also called ‘the Equation’ by authors like Edgington and Bennett, and
which has it that the probability of an indicative equals the corresponding conditional
probability. Lewis’ and others’ aforementioned triviality results (Lewis, 1976; Hajek, 1989)
are often taken as showing that the Equation can’t be quite right. However, it enjoys
considerable empirical support in the literature. We’ll soon see how things go with Adams’
Thesis.
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doesn’t shake your confidence that it will land heads sometimes in 50 tosses.
However, you don’t assign probability 1 to this. Your probability for C
conditionally on A is less than 1 and it passes your acceptance threshold.
Can one react by treating these as odd cases qua ‘missing link’ condition-
als? Conditionals with no relevant connection between their antecedent and
consequent, or in which the antecedent does not make a difference for the
consequent, may strike us as odd (Douven, 2017). One may say that in such
cases we don’t even apply the Suppositional Procedure. I will discuss such a
line of reply in the next Section.
Before we get there, I mention that there is empirical, psychological evi-
dence that the disconnection between our accepting C conditionally, on the
supposition A, and our accepting the corresponding conditional claim uncon-
ditionally, is widespread, and not a peculiarity. The experiments reported
in Douven and Verbrugge (2010) focused on degrees of acceptability, under-
stood as reasonableness to believe.5 Contexts (short stories) Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ 30
were given to a group of subjects, who were then asked to rate the accept-
ability of conditionals ‘If Ai, Ci’ in those Si. The same contexts Si were given
to another group of subjects, who were then asked to judge the probability
of Ci in Si on the supposition that Ai.
Now the experiments found out that people’s patterns of (degrees of) ac-
ceptance for conditionals generally don’t even approximate the corresponding
conditional probabilities.6 If we agree that estimates of conditional probabil-
ities robustly correlate to degrees of conditional acceptance, the results give
some evidence that there is, often enough, little correlation between people’s
acceptance of C conditionally on the supposition A, and people’s acceptance
of the corresponding conditional. In particular, the acceptability ratings are
in many cases significantly lower than the conditional probabilities. This
‘manifestly refute[s] Adams’ Thesis, both in its strict form ... and in its
5Or, as reasonableness to have an attitude functionally close enough to belief, if, as
non-propositionalists like Edgington (1995), Adams (1998), Bennett (2003), etc. think,
indicatives don’t express propositions and cannot generally have truth values. Then they
may not be believable, strictly speaking, insofar as to believe something is to believe it to
be true. But they can still be acceptable, and acceptability works in a way close enough
to believability even if it needs to be disentangled from the latter, to some extent, for non-
propositional indicatives. One may say that if an indicative doesn’t express a proposition,
then accepting it is, or at least requires, being disposed to do certain things with it,
which align to what one is disposed to do when one believes something that does have
a truth value. E.g., if one accepts ‘If p, then q’ and one believes that p, one is prone to
believe q as well. This function of acceptable conditionals as inference tickets is stressed
by non-propositionalists: see e.g. Bennett (2003), Ch. 8.
6As a helpful referee of this paper mentioned to me, results analogous to the Douven-
Verbrugge experiments are to be found also in the influential Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016).
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approximate form’ (Douven, 2016, 99).
The conditionals that behave better with respect to the Suppositional
Rule and Procedure are those in which C follows deductively from A plus
background, unstated assumptions: for them, at least a high correlation was
found between (degree of) acceptance and corresponding high conditional
probability (Douven, 2016, p. 100). However, the Suppositional Procedure
has it that, in deriving the consequences C of a supposition A, we may use
whatever appropriate means we have: we may proceed inductively, abduc-
tively, via a mixture of these, or also in imaginative ways that are not even
usefully labeled as ‘inferential’ – see also (Williamson, 2007, 151-2). And for
the corresponding non-deductive and especially inductive conditionals, not
even a high correlation was found in Douven and Verbrugge’s experiments.
Could a supporter of the material conditional analysis cum Williamsonian
defense retort that we are dealing with conditionals that are true, but odd
things to say, so that the issue is, after all, to be dealt with at the level
of pragmatics? In answer to this, one should say, first, that the truth of
the involved indicatives, or even just whether they can have truth values, is
not what is at issue here: what is, is the workings of the Suppositional Rule,
which was phrased in terms of attitudes, and of the Suppositional Procedure,
which was phrased in terms of acceptance.
Second, and more importantly: the Douven and Verbrugge experiments
are explicitly designed and phrased in terms of acceptability, not of asserta-
bility and its pragmatics. Acceptability as reasonableness to believe is not
subject to social norms the way assertion is: one may find something very
acceptable and reasonable, but inappropriate to assert in a given conversa-
tional context, e.g., because it would be off-topic, or an insensitive thing to
say, or whatnot. Douven and Verbrugge anticipated possible interpretations
of their results that question exactly what the subjects of their experiments
thought they were being asked: ‘for instance, they might have misunderstood
the questions about acceptability as asking whether it would be appropriate
to contribute the given conditional to a conversation taking place in the rel-
evant context.’ (Douven and Verbrugge, 2010, 310). So they also carried
out control experiments in which they (a) compared answers concerning ac-
ceptability to answers phrased directly in terms of reasonableness to believe;
and (b) directly asked the participants of their main experiments questions
about how they themselves had understood the notion of acceptability. Re-
porting on the results of such control experiments (whose detailed setup can
be checked in the original paper), they concluded:
the answers do suggest that the notion of acceptability was in-
terpreted in an epistemic sense rather than in some other sense;
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things that seem logical, or self-evident, or that can be taken
to be true, are probably things that are reasonable to believe,
though not obviously also things that it would be appropriate
to contribute to a conversation. Indeed, there was no indica-
tion that any of the participants had understood ‘acceptable’ as
meaning something like ‘conforming to broadly social norms gov-
erning good conversational practice.’ (Douven and Verbrugge,
2010, 311)
If Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture cannot be refuted by individual
recherché counterexamples because it is a ‘psychological hypothesis, which
in the end must live or die by psychological evidence’; and the Douven and
Verbrugge experiments, with the additional control experiment giving some
evidence that the subjects of the main experiment understood well enough
what they were asked, don’t count as psychological evidence against the
Suppositional Conjecture; then the Williamsonian position may begin to look
self-sealing: it starts to become unclear what could count as evidence against
it.
One may come up with another line of reply, however – one which makes
the issue of the distinction between acceptability and assertability moot. I
come to this in the next Section.
4 Missing Links?
One may argue that, if the recalcitrant conditionals are mostly ‘missing link’
conditionals – conditionals with no relevant connection between antecedent
and consequent –, then these pose no threat to the Suppositional Conjecture
because the Suppositional Procedure just isn’t applied with them. It has
been argued (Cruz et al., 2016) that the oddness of missing link conditionals
is connected to the lack of a shared subject matter or discourse topic between
antecedent and consequent. The mainstream way to deal with missing link
conditionals is to explain their oddness pragmatically (Douven, 2017). Take
the pragmatically bizarre:
3. If Trump wears a wig, then there will be some heads in the first 50
tosses of this coin.
All hands may agree that this seems unassertable in most natural conver-
sational contexts. Now, one may argue, it just doesn’t seem that we apply
the Suppositional Procedure to assess (3): why would one suppose anything
about Trump’s hair, develop the supposition in imagination, etc., while one
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wonders about the odds of this coin landing heads? We only suppose that
A, when there is some connection between it and the C we are wondering
about.
However, (2) and (3) seem to be importantly different. While it is hard
(though, admittedly, not impossible) to think of a topicality connection link-
ing antecedent and consequent in the latter, there obviously is one for the
former: both are about the coin. One can wonder how the coin is like, what
can happen to it. One can engage in the following procedure: supposing that
this coin is a penny; assessing the likelihood that it will land heads on its first
50 tosses in the hypothetical scenario; and finding out that it’s high enough,
and indeed just as high as it was for one before the suppositional exercise.
The general pattern: such cases will show up when one is unsure whether
the antecedent is true; finds the consequent likely enough to be true (though
one is perhaps not absolutely certain that it is); antecedent and consequent
have enough overlap in topic, contextually; and it makes sense for one to
engage in the suppositional exercise, to check whether the supposition of
the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. On finding out that
it doesn’t, one won’t judge the conditional (very) acceptable, even if the
conditional probability is high.
Take ‘Finland plays Uruguay in the next World Cup match’ and ‘Finland
won’t win the World Cup’. Both are about the Finnish national team and
its future doings in the World Cup. You think that, with all due sympathy,
it’s quite unlikely that Finland will win the World Cup, although you are not
ruling it out categorically. You are unsure who Finland is up against in the
next match. You suppose it’s Uruguay, wondering whether this will make
a difference for the chances of the Finnish team; develop the supposition
in imagination, etc.; and conclude that Finland’s chances of winning the
Cup remain just as low on this hypothesis. The probability of Finland not
winning the World Cup, conditionally on playing Uruguay next, is high for
you. Under the hypothesis that Finland plays Uruguay next, you accept that
Finland won’t win the World Cup. You don’t come to accept the conditional:
4. If Finland plays Uruguay in the next match, then it won’t win the
World Cup.
For you still deem it very unlikely that Finland will win the World Cup, and
you don’t think that playing Uruguay next makes a non-negligible difference
for Finland’s prospects.
Take a case in which the connection in subject matter is not engraved in
the denotations of the subsentential components of the sentences, but needs a
bit more context to be established: ‘My Uni runs a multi-million deficit’ and
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‘I will keep my job’. It’s easy for me to provide a context: in the Spring of
2020, I was confident enough, though not completely sure, that I’d keep my
academic job for a long while. (I have a permanent job and I’m doing fine;
but in my country there is no academic tenure properly so called.) Then the
covid-19 pandemic started, we had to shut down the campus, we began to lose
money in campus revenues, etc. So I asked myself the ‘What if?’ question: I
supposed my Uni would end up running a multi-million deficit, developed the
supposition in imagination mobilizing my background knowledge and beliefs,
etc. At the end of the suppositional exercise, I concluded that I was still just
as likely to keep my job, for a series of reasons. The likelihood of me keeping
my job, given the supposition, was high for me. I accepted that I’d keep my
job, under the supposition of my Uni running a multi-million deficit. But
the conditional
5. If my Uni runs a multi-million deficit, then I will keep my job
was not acceptable for me.7
Cases like (1), (2), (4), (5), have the shared feature that antecedent and
consequent share topic or subject matter in natural contexts, unlike what
happens with (3). And it seems to me that the corresponding suppositional
processes can be, on occasion, natural enough activities to engage in: one
can suppose that Venus is bigger than Mars, that this coin is a penny, that
Finland will play Uruguay, that one’s Uni runs a multi-million deficit; develop
the supposition in imagination, wondering about, respectively, Mars’ status
as a planet, the chances of the coin landing heads, Finland’s prospects in
the Cup, or one’s chances of keeping one’s job. At the end of the exercise,
one can robustly accept the consequent on the supposition of the antecedent:
after carrying out the imaginative exercise for a while, one stably judges the
likelihood of the consequent to be quite high in the imagined scenario. One
does not come to accept the conditional.
Perhaps the main point concerning cases like these, which is relevant for
the Suppositional Procedure, is that one may not know or believe in advance
that the likelihood of the consequent wouldn’t be affected by the envisaged
truth of the antecedent; one may not have thought about the issue at all
before. One carries out the suppositional exercise, and has a result: the
consequent is very likely and acceptable, given the antecedent. But, one
does not thereby come to accept the conditional itself. When one is unsure
about an A with some topicality connection to a C one already takes as
likely enough, there are lots of reasons why one may want to prospectively
7In case you are curious: my Uni did run a multi-million deficit in 2020. And I still
have my job.
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assess the hypothesis that the obtaining of A makes a difference for C, by
making it less likely, or perhaps more likely. When, after carrying out the
suppositional exercise, one concludes that C is just as likely conditional on A
as it is unconditionally, p(C|A) is high for the subject, but the corresponding
conditional can fail to be acceptable. What may be acceptable, at the end
of the suppositional exercise, is some concessive claim, ‘Whether or not A,
C’; ‘Even if A, still C’: ‘Whether or nor Finland plays Uruguay next, they
won’t win the World Cup’. ‘Even if my Uni runs a multi-million deficit, I’ll
still keep my job’. Concessives can take ‘even’ or ‘whether or not’ in the
antecedent; ‘still’ in the consequent; and don’t generally take ‘then’ in the
consequent (Douven, 2016, 119), as the role of ‘then’ is precisely to rule out
that C is the case whether or not A is the case (Iatridou, 1993).
One helpful referee of this paper asks: what about ‘non-interference’ (as
(Bennett, 2003, 57) calls them) missing link conditionals, which often seem to
be acceptable for one exactly when ‘the person holds C to be true and thinks
that A’s being true would not interfere with that’ (Ibid.), but which don’t
have an explicit ‘even’ or ‘whether or not’ in the antecedent, or a ‘still’ in the
consequent? One classic example is Wayne Davis (1983)’s ‘If you open the
refrigerator, it will not explode’, uttered by one who thinks that the refriger-
ator will not explode anyway, that is, under any circumstance. Are they just
concessives without concessive-signaling words like ‘even’, ‘whether or not’,
etc.? Do both concessive and Davis-conditionals differ from the other indica-
tives in truth conditions? Do they differ in content, in some sense of ‘content’,
albeit not a truth-conditional sense? So-called inferentialist accounts, which
take the relevance of the connection between antecedent and consequent to
be part of the truth-conditional meaning of indicatives (Krzyżanowska, 2015;
Douven et al., 2018, 2020, 2021), seem to be committed to claiming that both
concessives and Davis-conditionals differ in truth-conditional meaning from
ordinary indicatives. This view is criticized in Lassiter (2021) and, a helpful
referee of this paper suggests, the results in Cruz et al. (2016) may also be
taken as speaking against it.
I can be neutral on this, however, for the purposes of discussing the Sup-
positional Conjecture and Procedure. For whatever the answers to these tan-
gled questions, non-concessive, non-missing-link conditional sentences gen-
erally differ in acceptability from both concessives and Davis-conditionals,
whatever the truth-conditional meaning of these. And acceptability, not
truth-conditional propositional content, is what is at issue with the Supposi-
tional Conjecture. Williamson claims that the Suppositional Procedure op-
erates on sentences, rather than on the propositional contents they express
(Williamson, 2020, 17-18). The heuristic is at work at the level of verbal
reasoning, and verbal reasoning operates for him on things that are more
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fine-grained than truth-conditional contents taken, e.g., as sets of possible
worlds. As he says:
The heuristic fits in wherever verbal reasoning fits in. [...] For
these purposes, a psychologically realistic theory of verbal rea-
soning will have to treat it as operating over structural men-
tal representations such as interpreted sentences, not over bare
coarse-grained propositions. [...] [T]he fine-grained dynamics can
only be properly understood at a level where sentential structure
has not been left behind. (Williamson, 2020, 24).
Now ‘If A, then C’ is normally acceptable precisely when ‘Even if A, still
C’, or ‘Whether or not A, C’ isn’t. And Davis-conditionals seem to have
acceptability conditions that match those of concessives, whether they differ
in meaning or not. One who accepts ‘If you open the refrigerator, it will
not explode’ in a situation in which one thinks it will not explode under any
circumstance, will accept precisely the concessives ‘Whether or not you open
the refrigerator, it will not explode’, or ‘Even if you open the refrigerator,
it will not explode’. And one will reject the addition of a ‘then’ before the
consequent: ‘If you open the refrigerator, then it will not explode’. For such
an addition would convey the idea that ‘If you don’t open the refrigerator, it
will not explode’ is not acceptable for one; whereas, in the context, it clearly
is.
Finally, only some conditionals uttered in real life have the acceptability
conditions of concessives or Davis-conditionals, and possibly only a minor-
ity of them do: even lacking statistics, people with very different views on
missing link conditionals and concessives agree that conditionals whose an-
tecedent does make a difference for the consequent are the default in English:
see e.g. Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016); Douven (2017); Lassiter (2021). In-
sofar as the Suppositional Conjecture is advanced as one that applies to
indicative conditional sentences in general, it’s not enough for it to work fine
with concessives or Davis-conditionals only.
5 Conclusion
It may be, then, that our ‘primary way of prospectively assessing condition-
als’ is not quite the Suppositional Procedure but rather some fixing of the
Procedure, which adds to it some constraint linking antecedent and conse-
quent: in order for us to accept ‘If A, then C’, it is necessary but not sufficient
that we accept C on the supposition A; in addition, the supposition must, in
some sense, make a relevant difference for the truth or likelihood of C. One
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would need to make precise the notion of a conditional antecedent ‘making
a relevant difference’ for its consequent. Relevance for conditionals, how-
ever, is one of the most elusive concepts, and very different treatments of it
have been proposed: (non-classical) logical, as in relevant logics (Dunn and
Restall, 2002); probabilistic-evidential (Douven, 2016); based on default-and-
penalty hypotheses (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016); on causal connectedness
(Schulz and van Rooij, 2019); on evidential support (Crupi and Iacona, 2020);
on coherence relations between discourse clauses (Lassiter, 2021); or on yet
other notions. How to fix the Suppositional Procedure to take relevance into
account seems to be an open issue.
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